Minimum wages

 1. For what it's worth, my model of the effects of minimum wages is this.

2.  The labour market consists of a covered and uncovered sector. In the old literature, the uncovered was illegal working, here I think of it as being self-employment.

3. A job consists of wage and non-wage payments eg. a wage per hour and "working conditions".  The latter might be: holidays, paid tea breaks, number of breaks, effort at work, how horrible or nice the boss it etc. etc. 

4. When a minimum wage comes along, adjustment is along many margins.  Wages might rise, but employment contracting status might change and non-wage attributes might change.  Once the min wage gets to a certain level, there is no more adjustment avaiable though non-wage attributes and employment might then fall.

5. Here is an example of adjustment of attributes.  From the March 2016 NBER digest.  

In Delivering Higher Pay? The Impacts of a Task-Level Pay Standard in the Gig Economy (NBER Working Paper 34545), Yuan An, Andrew Garin, and Brian K. Kovak examine Seattle's App-Based Worker Minimum Payment Ordinance, which took effect in January 2024. The ordinance, which applies to tasks starting or ending within the city limits, establishes a minimum base compensation for delivery tasks as the greater of $0.44 per minute plus $0.74 per mile, or $5 per task. 

The researchers analyze unique data from Gridwise, a third-party app that tracks detailed gig work activity across multiple platforms. Their dataset covers over 2.8 million tasks completed by nearly 6,000 workers in Washington state from August 2023 through July 2024. It includes task-level information on base pay, tips, bonuses, locations, and timing. The researchers compare workers whose pre-reform delivery activity was concentrated in Seattle with workers active elsewhere in Washington state.

The minimum pay standard immediately doubled average base pay per task in Seattle from $5.37 to $12.52 while pay rates remained constant in the rest of the state. However, average tips per delivery declined substantially following the policy, offsetting over one-third of the base pay increase.

For highly attached incumbent drivers, who completed an above-median number of tasks pre-reform (approximately 20 per month), increased base earnings per task were offset both by decreased tips and by a reduction in the number of tasks completed per month. By February 2024, the number of monthly tasks fell by at least 20 percent. Taken together, drivers’ monthly earnings remained virtually unchanged after the reform. 

6. So the non-wage attributes, here tips, entirely offset the wage rise.  There were other effects for non-incumbents, but overall nothing got better.

7. Of course, we want workers to be compensated well.  But this question for min wage setters, I think, is a different one: do they have the information to set better the balance between wage and non-wage attributes than that prevailing in the market?

 

 

Error and fraud in R&D tax credits

 To look at this, this HMRC report, from 2023, looked at claims in 2020-21.  They say that there has been reforms since then.  Here are the findings from " based on 97% of cases in the MREP with a finalised compliance audit" : 

As the final row shows, 16.7% of claims, representing over £1b are error and fraud.  

An updated table, published in October 2024,  gives more current data, based on estimates

And some examples of this in action are by Dan Neidle, here for example on claiming R&D tax credits from footballer wages.

Returning to the 2023, report, some comments from the report

Analysis of the MREP shows that around half of all claims, by volume, contained at least some element of non-compliance. HMRC found fraud indicators in fewer than 10% of claims examined in the random enquiry programme and these claims accounted for less than 5% of the total value claimed. To be classified as fraud, a caseworker needs to have found evidence that the claimant deliberately set out to misrepresent their circumstances to get money to which they were not entitled.

This indicates that the majority of non-compliance is down to other behaviours. As with other regimes, the term ‘non-compliance’ or ‘error and fraud’ encapsulates this full range of behaviours, from mistakes and failure to take reasonable care through to deliberate non-compliance.

In claims where expenditure was over £1 million, around 75% of claims were fully compliant. In smaller claims the percentage of claims being fully compliant was lower, at between 35% and 64%.

As the size of expenditure decreases, the value of non-compliance expressed as a percentage of the value of the claim increases. In the smallest claims where expenditure was less than £10,000, over 75% of the value of the claim was non-compliant. 

The end of rent sharing in the UK

 Bell, Brian, Bukowski, Pawel & Machin, Stephen (2024) The decline in rent sharing. Labor Economics, 42(3), 683 - 716. https://doi.org/10.1086/724570, links here and working paper here study the extent to which wages are correlated with UK company profits/rents.  Using industry and company data and controlling for exogeneity etc. they find a consistent picture, summarised in their Figure 3, working paper version, below

Before 1999, the central estiamte was that wages were marked up by around 25% of firm value added and 7% of  profits.  After 1999 that figure is below 10% and 1% respectively and insignificantly different from zero.  Similar results are obtained for EU industries using industry level data.  

CPI, RPI and CPIH, summary of differences

 

The final table in Consumer Price Indices, Technical Manual, 2019

https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/methodologies/consumerpricesindicestechnicalmanual2019